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Abstract. In this paper, we describe a sequence of simple, yet efficient
chosen-plaintext (or chosen-ciphertext) attacks against reduced-round
versions of IDEA (with 2, 2.5, 3, 3.5, and 4 rounds) which compare
favourably with the best known attacks: some of them decrease consider-
ably the time complexity given the same order of data at disposal while
other ones decrease the amount of necessary known- or chosen-plaintext
pairs under comparable time complexities. Additionally, we show how
to trade time and memory for some of the known-plaintext attacks of
Nakahara et al.
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1 Introduction
Although the IDEA block cipher [10–12] is one of the oldest proposals of alter-
native to DES [18], it has withstood all kinds of cryptanalytical attacks sur-
prinsingly well until now. Its strength is certainly due to an elegant and simple
design approach which consists in mixing three algebraically incompatible group
operations, namely the addition of vectors over GF (2)
16
, denoted “⊕”, the addi-
tion of integers over Z216 , denoted “”, and the multiplication in GF
(
216 + 1
)
∗
,
denoted “”. Despite the popularity of IDEA (due surely to the fact that it
was chosen as the block cipher in the first versions of the software Pretty Good
Privacy (PGP) [7] by Zimmerman), its cryptanalysis process has been a rather
lengthy process. To the best of our knowldege, Meier [14] was the first to propose
an attack based on differential cryptanalysis against up to 2.5 rounds running
faster than an exhaustive search. Then, Borst et al. [3] presented a differential-
linear attack against 3 rounds and a truncated differential attack on 3.5 rounds;
Biham et al. [1] managed to break 4.5 rounds using impossible differentials. Mo-
tivated by a paper of Nakahara et al. [15] explaining how to break 2.5 rounds
using an integral attack, Demirci [5] was able to break up to 4 rounds; one
year later, these results were extended [6] using meet-in-the-middle techniques
to break up to 5 rounds slightly faster than an exhaustive search. Very recently,
Nakahara et al. [16] devised known-plaintext attacks against reduced-round ver-
sions of IDEA using ideas of Demirci as well as an (unpublished) observation of
Biryukov. Other papers [2,4,8] present attacks against the full version of IDEA,
but these attacks fortunately work only for a negligible fraction of the keys.
Contributions of this paper: Inspired by some of the ideas in the paper of
Nakahara et al. [16], we describe a sequence of new attacks against reduced-round
versions of IDEA, up to 4 rounds; these attacks are mainly based on the Biryukov-
Demirci relation. Some of them, given a comparable computational complexity,
reduce considerably the amount of necessary chosen plaintexts, while other at-
tacks, given a comparable amount of chosen plaintexts, decrease favourably the
computational complexity; additionaly, we show how to trade time and mem-
ory for some of the known-plaintext attacks of Nakahara et al. Furthermore, we
explain how to combine some of these attacks with other known attacks, which
allows in some cases to gain more key bits with a lesser complexity, or to avoid
the use of both encryption and decryption oracles. This paper is organized as
follows: we recall briefly in §2 the inner details of IDEA, and the attacks are
described in §3. Finally, we compare our results to the best known attacks in §4.
2 The IDEA block cipher
IDEA encrypts 64-bit data blocks under a 128-bit key; it consists of eight iden-
tical rounds and a final half-round (a key addition layer similar to those in a
full round). Figure 1 illustrates the computational flow of one round. Round r
transforms a 64-bit input represented as a vector of four 16-bit words to an out-
put vector of the same size: (X
(r)
1 , X
(r)
2 , X
(r)
3 , X
(r)
4 ) 7→ (Y
(r)
1 , Y
(r)
2 , Y
(r)
3 , Y
(r)
4 ).
This process is parametered by six 16-bit subkeys denoted Z
(r)
i , with 1 ≤ i ≤ 6,
which are derived from the master 128-bit key by means of the key-schedule
algorithm. One evaluates the three IDEA algebraic operations as follows: ⊕ is a
simple exclusive-or operation,  is the addition modulo 216 and  is the common
multiplication modulo 216 + 1 (where 0 is considered as the number 216). First,
two intermediate values α(r) and β(r) are computed:
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)
These two values form the input of the multiplication-addition box (MA-box)
which provides two 16-bit outputs γ(r) and δ(r):
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5
)
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6
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5
)
 δ(r)
Finally, the output of the round r is given by
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Fig. 1. Round r of IDEA
A half-round is defined to be the key-addition layer; we denote its output
(C
(r)
1 , C
(r)
2 , C
(r)
3 , C
(r)
4 ) . The key-schedule of IDEA allows to derive fifty-two 16-
bit subkeys out of the 128-bit key Z. Its description is straightforward; first,
order the subkeys as
Z
(1)
1 , . . . , Z
(1)
6 , Z
(2)
1 , . . . , Z
(2)
6 , . . . , Z
(9)
1 , . . . , Z
(9)
4
partition Z into eight 16-bit blocks, and assign these blocks directly to the first
eight subkeys. Then, do the following until all remaining subkeys are assigned:
rotate Z left 25 bits, partition the result, and assign these blocks to the next
eight subkeys. In Figure 2, we give explicitely the value of the subkeys (where
Z[0...15] means the bits 0 to 15 (inclusive) of Z, Z[117...4] means the bits 117-127
and 0-4 of Z, and where the leftmost bit of Z is numbered with 0).
3 Description of the Attacks
In this section, we describe new attacks breaking 2-rounds, 2.5-rounds, 3-rounds,
3.5-rounds, and 4-rounds IDEA, and we compute their complexity. But first of
Round r Z
(r)
1 Z
(r)
2 Z
(r)
3 Z
(r)
4 Z
(r)
5 Z
(r)
6
1 Z[0...15] Z[16...31] Z[32...47] Z[48...63] Z[64...79] Z[80...95]
2 Z[96...111] Z[112...127] Z[25...40] Z[41...56] Z[57...72] Z[73...88]
3 Z[89...104] Z[105...120] Z[121...8] Z[9...24] Z[50...65] Z[66...81]
4 Z[82...97] Z[98...113] Z[114...1] Z[2...17] Z[18...33] Z[34...49]
5 Z[75...90] Z[91...106] Z[107...122] Z[123...10] Z[11...26] Z[27...42]
6 Z[43...58] Z[59...74] Z[100...115] Z[116...3] Z[4...19] Z[20...35]
7 Z[36...51] Z[52...67] Z[68...83] Z[84...99] Z[125...12] Z[13...28]
8 Z[29...44] Z[45...60] Z[61...76] Z[77...92] Z[93...108] Z[109...124]
8.5 Z[22...37] Z[38...53] Z[54...69] Z[70...85]
Fig. 2. Complete Key-Schedule of IDEA
all, we recall what is the Biryukov-Demirci relation, as it builds the core of our
distinguishers.
3.1 The Biryukov-Demirci Relation
A crucial observation on which our attacks is based is that there exists a linear-
like expression holding with probability one on any number of rounds. Nakahara
et al. [17] name it Biryukov-Demirci relation. It is actually a combination of two
facts, one of these being the following observation by Demirci [5].
Lemma 1 (Demirci [5]). For any round number r of the IDEA block cipher,
lsb
(
γ(r) ⊕ δ(r)
)
= lsb
(
α(r)  Z
(r)
5
)
(1)
where lsb(a) denotes the least significant (rightmost) bit of a.
Using this theorem, one can easily set up a distinguisher using a few known
triplets (α(r), γ(r), δ(r)) which works as follows: for each possible value of Z
(r)
5 ,
check whether Eq. (1) hold for the known triplets; this allows to sieve wrong
values of Z
(r)
5 from the right one. Actually, one gets two candidates for Z
(r)
5 ,
as observed by Demirci: if Z
(r)
5 /∈ {0, 1}, this distinguisher eliminates all keys
except the correct one and a “conjugate” 216 +1−Z
(r)
5 . Otherwise, it eliminates
all keys except 0 and 1.
The second (unpublished) observation1 states that the two middle words in a
block of data are only combined either with subkeys or with internal cipher data,
via group operations (namely ⊕ and ) which are GF(2)-linear when considering
their least significant (rightmost) bit; this fact is valid across the full cipher (and
is actually independent of the number of rounds). Combining this observation
and Lemma 1, one easily obtain the Biryukov-Demirci relation.
1 According to [17], this observation is credited to Biryukov.
Theorem 1 (Biryukov-Demirci relation). For any number of rounds n in
the IDEA block cipher, the following expression is true with probability one:
lsb
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)
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2 ⊕X
(1)
3 ⊕ Y
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=
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
 n⊕
j=1
(
Z
(j)
2 ⊕ Z
(j)
3
)
Note that Theorem 1 can easily be extended when a final half-round (key-
addition layer) is present by adding the two relevant key bits.
3.2 Retrieving All Key Bits for 1.5 Rounds
The simplest attack described in [17] is built on top of the following expression
holding with probability one; it is a straightforward application of Theorem 1 to
1.5-rounds IDEA.
lsb
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Z
(1)
5 
((
X
(1)
1  Z
(1)
1
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X
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3  Z
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3
)))
= 0 (2)
By taking into account the key-schedule algorithm and guessing key bits num-
bered (see Figure 2) 0-15, 32-47, 64-79, which represent 48 unknown key bits,
one can recover these right key bits and lsb
(
Z
(1)
2 ⊕ Z
(2)
2
)
with probability larger
than 0.99 in roughly 3 · 1230 ·2
48 ≈ 248.26 1.5-rounds IDEA evaluations if 55 known
plaintext-ciphertext pairs are available using Alg. 1. The complexity of this at-
Algorithm 1 Attack breaking 1.5-round IDEA
1: Input: An oracle Ω implementing encryption by 1.5-rounds IDEA under a fixed,
unknown key.
2: Query the ciphertexts corresponding to 55 different, uniformly distributed plain-
texts Pi to Ω.
3: for all possible subkey candidates (Z
(1)
1 , Z
(1)
3 , Z
(1)
5 ) do
4: Check whether the expression
lsb
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(3)
gives the same bit for the two first pairs. If yes, take sequentially other pairs as
long as Eq. (3) evaluates to a constant. If it holds for all 55 pairs, output “Key
candidate”.
5: end for
tack can be evaluated as follows: for each key candidate, one needs to evaluate
Eq. (3) at least two times, three times with probability 14 , four times with prob-
ability 18 , and so on, which results in an average of three evaluations of Eq. (3);
as in [17], we assume furthermore that a  operation is equivalent to three
⊕ (or three ) operations: thus, one evaluation of Eq. (3) costs 12 simple op-
erations while a full evaluation of 1.5-round IDEA costs 30 simple operations.
Note that we may have adopted the strategy of [17], which consists in guessing
lsb
(
Z
(1)
2 ⊕ Z
(2)
2
)
as well and evaluating Eq. (2). In this case, one would need one
pair of known plaintext-ciphertext more to ensure the same success probability,
and the complexity would have been equal to 2 · 1430 ·2
49 ≈ 248.90, which is slightly
worse.
We observe that one can actually apply a common trick2 to the Biryukov-
Demirci relation and thus extend Nakahara et al. attack: we can apply the rela-
tion in two directions, namely in the encryption or in the decryption direction.
When applied to the decryption direction, the distinguisher Eq. (2) becomes
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Although it would not be more interesting to use Eq. (4) alone as distinguisher
(since one should guess the same number of unknown key bits), one can use it
after Eq. (2) to recover all key bits using roughly the same amount of compu-
tational effort. More precisely, once the key bits 0-15, 32-47, 64-79 are known,
which actually fix Z
(1)
1 and Z
(1)
5 , one can recover Z
(2)
1 and Z
(2)
2 (key bits num-
bered 96-127) in a 3 · 1230 · 2
32 ≈ 232.26 effort, derive the key bit 31, and search
exhaustively for the remaining 47 unknown key bits. The overall complexity of
this attack is approximately equal to 248.26 + 247 + 232.26 ≈ 248.76 1.5-round
IDEA evaluations.
3.3 A New Chosen-Plaintext Attack Breaking 2 Rounds
Let us consider the relation Eq. (2) on 2 rounds, and let us fix X
(1)
1 and X
(1)
3
to arbitrary constants3. Our attack proceeds as follows and assumes that the
adversary is able to encrypt about 62 chosen plaintexts: as first step, encrypt
23 chosen plaintexts with fixed X
(1)
1 and X
(1)
3 , and guess Z
(2)
5 . In a second step,
guess Z
(2)
6 and test Eq. (2) on the partially decrypted ciphertext, and determine
these unknown key bits with help of Eq. (2) by eliminating the candidates which
do not render this expression constant, since the expression
lsb
(
Z
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((
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)
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X
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)))
2 This trick was proposed for the first time, as far as this author knows, by Matsui [13]
in the linear cryptanalysis of DES.
3 A similar technique was used by Knudsen and Mathiassen [9] to speed up by a small
constant a linear cryptanalysis of DES.
provides an unknown, but constant bit to the cryptanalyst. This process gives us
4 candidates for the key bits 57-88 within a complexity of less than 220 2-rounds
IDEA evaluations.
Once this process is achieved, one can use the attacks described in §3.2 to
derive key bits 0-15 and 32-47 in a 233 effort and key bits 96-127 in another 233
effort with 39 additional chosen-plaintext. Hence, this attacks recovers all key
bits (the 31 remaining ones with help of an exhaustive search) in a computa-
tional complexity approximately equal to 234 2-rounds IDEA evaluations. Thus,
this attack compares quite favorably with Demirci’s square-like attack [5] which
requires roughly the same order of chosen-plaintexts and a 264 computational
effort to recover the whole key.
If a decryption oracle is available, instead of an encryption one, we can still
mount a chosen-ciphertext attack based on the same properties. It would work
as follows: fix Y
(2)
1 and Y
(2)
3 to an arbitrary constant, and guess Z
(1)
1 , Z
(1)
3 , and
Z
(1)
5 (which represent 48 unknown key bits numbered 0-15, 32-47, and 64-79).
Once these 48 bits recovered, after a 248 process (provided 55 chosen plaintexts
are available), one can recover 16 more bits (i.e. the still unknown bits of Z
(2)
5
and Z
(2)
6 in a second step, and 32 more (numbered 96-127 and corresponding to
subkeys Z
(2)
1 and Z
(2)
2 ) in a third step; finally, the remaining ones can be found
with help of an exhaustive search.
3.4 A New Chosen-Plaintext Attack Breaking 2.5, 3, and 3.5
Rounds
If we apply the Demirci-Biryukov relation to 2.5-rounds IDEA, then one gets the
following expression:
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where Z1
(3)
denotes the inverse of Z
(3)
1 relatively to the group operation . If
we use the same trick than for 2 rounds and fix X
(1)
1 and X
(1)
3 , an adversary
can recover Z
(2)
5 , Z1
(3)
and Z
(3)
2 (key bits 57-72 and 89-120) in a 2
48 effort if
55 chosen-plaintexts are available (the success probability is then larger than
0.99). Once achieved, one can recover 39 key bits (Z
(1)
1 , Z
(3)
1 and the remaining
unknown bits of Z
(5)
1 ) numbered 0-15, 32-47 and 73-79 with the same distin-
guisher where Eq. (5) is fixed and known. For this, we need 46 additional known
plaintexts. The remaining 41 key bits can be recovered with an exhaustive search
within negligible computational complexity. Note that in this case, the Demirci-
Biryukov relation applied on the decryption operation results in the same dis-
tinguisher. As far as we know, it is the fastest attack on 2.5-rounds IDEA not
involving any weak-key assumption.
If a decryption oracle is available, instead of an encryption one, it is possible
to mount a similar (chosen-ciphertext) attack: fix C
(2)
1 and C
(2)
2 to an arbitrary
constant, and guess Z
(1)
1 , Z
(1)
3 , and Z
(1)
5 . In a second step, guess the remain-
ing unknown bits of Z
(3)
1 , Z
(3)
2 , and Z
(2)
5 ; one can finalize the attack using an
exhaustive search.
We can extend to 3 rounds the attack previously described in a straightfor-
ward way: actually, if we fix X
(1)
1 and X
(1)
3 and guess Z
(2)
5 , Z1
(3)
, Z
(3)
2 , Z
(3)
5 and
Z
(3)
6 (which represent key bits numbered 50-81 and 89-120), one can recover 64
key bits in a 264 process if 71 chosen-plaintext are available. Then, once Z
(2)
5 ,
Z1
(3)
, Z
(3)
2 , Z
(3)
5 and Z
(3)
6 are known, one can apply the attack on 2.5 rounds
to derive 49 more bits (numbered 0-15, 32-47, 73-79 and 127) with negligible
complexity and the remaining 15 bits can finally be searched exhaustively.
The chosen-ciphertext version of this attack is clearly less effective, since one
has to guess at least 96 unknown key bits (corresponding to subkeys Z
(3)
5 , Z
(3)
6 ,
Z
(3)
1 , Z
(3)
2 , Z
(2)
5 , Z
(1)
1 , Z
(1)
3 , and Z
(1)
5 ; the unknown key bits are numbered 0-15,
32-47, 50-81,and 89-120).
For attacking 3.5 rounds, one uses a new time the distinguisher described
above, one fixes X
(1)
1 and X
(1)
3 and one guesses furthermore all the keys of
the last half-round; the subkeys under consideration are then Z
(2)
5 , Z
(3)
1 , Z
(3)
2 ,
Z
(3)
5 , Z
(3)
6 , Z
(4)
1 , Z
(4)
2 , Z
(4)
3 and Z
(4)
4 (i.e. all the key bits but the interval 18-49,
representing 96 key bits). The computational effort is approximately equal to
297 if 103 chosen-plaintexts are available.
The same attack can be adapted for a decryption oracle, however resulting in
a higher complexity: if 119 chosen-ciphertext are available to an attacker (where
C
(4)
1 and C
(4)
3 are fixed to an arbitrary constant), then one can recover 112 key
bits numbered 0-111 (corresponding to subkeys Z
(2)
5 , Z
(2)
1 , Z
(2)
3 , Z
(1)
5 , Z
(1)
6 , Z
(1)
1 ,
Z
(1)
2 , Z
(1)
3 , and Z
(1)
4 ).
3.5 Trading Time and Memory
We show now that it is possible under certain circumstances to trade memory
and time complexities in the attacks of Nakahara et al. [17].
Let us consider 2.5-rounds IDEA, and let us assume that we have 55 known
plaintext-ciphertext pairs at disposal. For all possible values of Z
(1)
1 , Z
(3)
1 , and
Z
(1)
5 (i.e. key bits numbered 0-15, 32-47, and 64-79), we can compute a guess for
the value of the following expression.
Z
(1)
2 ⊕ Z
(2)
2 ⊕ Z
(2)
3 ⊕ Z
(3)
2 ⊕ Z
(3)
3︸ ︷︷ ︸
constant
⊕ lsb
(
δ(2) ⊕ γ(2)
)
(6)
The sub-sum depending only of the key bits is unknown but constant. Let us store
all these guesses in a large hash table made of 248 55-bit words, As second step of
the attack, one guesses the key bits Z
(2)
5 , Z
(3)
1 , and Z
(3)
2 (i.e. bits numbered 57-72
and 89-120): for all these guesses, and for the 55 ciphertexts, we can compute (by
partially decrypting the ciphertexts) the value of lsb(δ(2) ⊕ γ(2)) and checking
whether this value (or its complement) is stored in the table or not. With high
probability, the right subkey candidate will be determined by one of the few
expected matches. This attack hence requires two times 55 · 248 ≈ 254 partial
encryptions/decryptions, and 248 memory cells, while the remaining 41 unknown
bits can be recovered with an exhaustive search within negligible complexity.
The attack can be extended to more rounds in the following way. Using the
same approach than for the 2.5-round case, one computes a hash table contain-
ing, for all possible values of Z
(1)
1 , Z
(3)
1 , and Z
(1)
5 , a guess for
Z
(1)
2 ⊕ Z
(2)
2 ⊕ Z
(2)
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(3)
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(3)
3︸ ︷︷ ︸
constant
⊕ lsb
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δ(2) ⊕ γ(2)
)
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for 71 known plaintext-ciphertext pairs. In a second step, by guessing Z
(2)
5 , Z
(3)
1 ,
Z
(3)
2 , Z
(3)
5 , and Z
(3)
5 (i.e. key bits numbered 50-81 and 89-120), one can recover
a total of 96 key bits, the remaining 32 ones with help of an exhaustive search,
in an approximate overall computational complexity of 270 operations.
Finally, this attack can be extended to 3.5 rounds if we guess the additional
unknown key bits of Z
(4)
1 , Z
(4)
2 , Z
(4)
3 , and Z
(4)
4 (i.e. bits numbered 0-17 and 121-
127). One needs in this case 103 known plaintext-ciphertext pairs, 248 103-bit
words of memory, and a computational complexity of about 2103 operations.
The same attack strategy on 4 rounds would imply guessing all the key bits,
thus it is less efficient than an exhaustive key search.
3.6 Combination with other Attacks
Interestingly, we note that our attacks can be used in parallel with other attacks
to gain more key bits. For instance, the attack on 3-rounds IDEA of Demirci et
al.described in [6] is able to recover the values of Z
(1)
2 , Z
(1)
4 , Z
(2)
5 , and Z
(3)
5 (which
represents 41 key bits) in a 242 effort (after a 264 precomputation). Then, to de-
rive 32 other key bits, the authors assume that a decryption oracle is available.
If it is not the case, one can still relax this condition by applying the attack de-
scribed in §3.4 and recover 41 additional key bits, namely those numbered 73-81
and 89-120, within negligible computational complexity. Similar considerations
apply if only a decryption oracle is available.
Another interesting combination of known attacks and the ones described in
this paper is the following: in [5], Demirci describes a square-like distinguisher
which, with help of two sets of 232 chosen-plaintexts, allows to recover Z
(3)
5 in
about 249 operations. If, in a second step, we plug the obtained value of Z
(3)
5
into the attack described in §3.4, we can derive 48 other key bits numbered 66-
81, and 89-120 in a 249 computational effort in a second step, and finally the
remaining bits within negligible time. This defines an attack which derives all key
bits within 250 operations if 233 chosen-plaintexts are available. This represents
a computational complexity decrease by a factor of about 232. Unfortunately,
the same strategy does only marginally improve the attack against 3.5 (or more
rounds): one can replace the final exhaustive search of the remaining 80-bit keys
by our more efficient attack.
3.7 A New Square-Like Distinguisher
As observed for the first time by Nakahara et al. [15] and later by Demirci [5],
square-like distinguishers can be used with success to attack IDEA. We present
now such a distinguisher which is somewhat simpler to use than the ones available
in the literature.
Lemma 2 (Square-Like Distinguisher on 2.5-Round IDEA). Let 216 dif-
ferent inputs of 2.5-round IDEA be defined as follows: X
(1)
1 , X
(1)
2 , and X
(1)
3 are
fixed to arbitrary constants, and X
(1)
4 takes all possible values. Then the XOR of
the 216 values of the equation
X
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2 ⊕X
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3 ⊕ C
(1)
2 ⊕ C
(1)
3 ⊕
Z
(1)
2 ⊕ Z
(1)
3 ⊕ Z
(2)
2 ⊕ Z
(2)
3 ⊕ Z
(3)
2 ⊕ Z
(3)
3 ⊕
lsb
(
γ(1) ⊕ δ(1)
)
⊕ lsb
(
γ(2) ⊕ δ(2)
)
(7)
is equal to 0 with probability one.
We can then use this distinguisher to attack reduced-round versions of IDEA. To
attack 3 rounds, encrypt 39 different structures of 216 chosen plaintexts according
to Lemma 2. Then, for all possible values of Z
(3)
5 and Z
(3)
6 (i.e. bits numbered
50-81), partially decrypt the ciphertext for the 39 structures using the same
iterative strategy as in Alg. 1. This attack recovers 32 key bits, and with a few
more chosen plaintexts, we can apply the attack on 2.5-rounds described in §3.4
to recover all the keys bits. In summary, this attack requires less than 222 chosen-
plaintexts and a computational complexity of approximately 250 operations.
On 3.5 rounds, we can attack the round keys Z
(3)
5 , Z
(4)
1 , and Z
(4)
2 (i.e. 48 key
bits numbered 50-65 and 82-113) in a similar fashion. In this case, we need 55
structures of 216 chosen plaintexts (i.e. less than 222 chosen plaintexts as well),
and a computational complexity of approximately 3 · 216 · 248 ≈ 266 operations.
Finally, we can attack 4 rounds using the same strategy by guessing further
key bits, i.e. those of Z
(4)
5 and of Z
(4)
6 , which represents 80 unknown bits in
total. Hence, we need about 87 structures of 216 chosen plaintexts, which is less
than 223 chosen plaintexts, and a computational cost of about 3 · 216 · 280 ≈ 298
operations.
4 Summary of the Attacks
In this paper, we have used the same kind of properties derived by Demirci [5]
and Nakahara et al. [16] to derive a sequence of simple, yet efficient attacks
Rounds Data Time Attack type Ref. Note
2 210 CP 242 differential [14]
2 62 CP 234 linear-like §3.3
2 23 CP 264 square-like [5]
2.5 210 CP 2106 differential [14] Memory: 296
2.5 210 CP 232 differential [4] For one key out of 277
2.5 218 CP 258 square [15]
2.5 232 CP 259 square [15]
2.5 248 CP 279 square [15]
2.5 2 CP 237 square [15] Under 216 rel. keys
2.5 55 CP 281 square-like [5]
2.5 101 CP 248 linear-like §3.4
2.5 97 KP 290 linear-like [16]
2.5 55 KP 254 linear-like §3.5 Memory: 248
3 229 CP 244 differential-linear [3]
3 71 CP 271 square-like [5]
3 71 CP 264 linear-like §3.4
3 233 CP 264 collision [6] Memory: 264
3 233 CP 250 linear-like + [5] §3.6
3 222 CP 250 square-like §3.7
3 71 KP 270 linear-like §3.5 Memory: 248
3.5 256 CP 267 truncated diff. [3]
3.5 238.5 CP 253 impossible diff. [1] Memory: 248
3.5 234 CP 282 square-like [5]
3.5 224 CP 273 collision [6]
3.5 222 CP 266 square-like §3.7
3.5 103 CP 2103 square-like [5]
3.5 103 CP 297 linear-like §3.4
3.5 119 KP 2112 linear-like [16]
3.5 103 KP 297 linear-like §3.5 Memory: 248
4 237 CP 270 impossible diff. [1] Memory: 248
4 234 CP 2114 square-like [5]
4 224 CP 289 collision [6] Memory: 264
4 223 CP 298 square-like §3.7
4 121 KP 2114 linear-like [16]
4.5 264 CP 2112 impossible diff. [1]
4.5 224 CP 2121 collision [6] Memory: 264
5 224 CP 2126 collision [6] Memory: 264
Fig. 3. Attacks against IDEA
against reduced-round versions of IDEA; the attacks against 2 and 2.5 rounds
are the best known ones not involving any weak-key assumption, to the best
of our knowledge. Some of them, given the same order of computational com-
plexity, reduce the amount of necessary chosen plaintexts, while other attacks,
given a comparable amount of chosen texts, decrease favorably the computa-
tional complexity; additionally, some tradeoffs between time and memory are
presented, which lead to far less complex attacks using only known plaintext-
ciphertext pairs. Furthermore, we showed how to use some of these attacks in
combination with other known attacks, which allows sometimes to gain more
key bits with a lesser complexity, or to avoid the use of both encryption and
decryption oracles. The more important attacks against this block cipher are
tabulated in Figure 3, where KP (resp. CP) means “known plaintext-ciphertext
pairs” (resp. “chosen-plaintexts”), as well as their respective complexities. We
observed that it is possible to dramatically decrease the complexity attacking
IDEA by combining “independent” properties in a divide-and-conquer fashion.
A nice illustration is certainly the attack on 3-rounds IDEA described in §3.6:
it allows to reduce the computational complexity from 282 down to 250 and to
somewhat approach the performances of the attack by Borst et al. [3] based on
truncated differentials. In another case, we are able to relax some conditions,
like the need of two oracles. Although such combinatorial properties (mainly
due to the key-schedule algorithm) do not seem to result in a threat against the
full version of the cipher, an important open question is to know whether such
properties can be extended to attack more rounds.
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